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K A A N  K A N G A L
For varied reasons and on various occasions, contemporary natural sci-
entists and philosophers, Marxist and non-Marxist alike, have expressed 
their admiration for Frederick Engels, the cofounder of dialectical mate-
rialism and scientific socialism.
Ilya Prigogine, winner of the 1977 Nobel Prize in Chemistry, wrote that 
the “idea of a history of nature as an integral part of materialism was assert-
ed by [Karl] Marx and, in greater detail, by Engels.” Modern developments in 
natural sciences have raised philosophical issues that dialectical materialists 
have long investigated. When Engels was working on his Dialectics of Nature 
in the 1870s and ’80s, there was a visible tendency on the rise in the natural 
sciences that “rejected the mechanistic world view,” drawing “closer to the 
idea of an historical development of nature.” Engels contributed to making 
explicit what was already implicit in the natural sciences of his time. Now 
as then, the natural sciences are occupied with the question of “how can the 
world of processes and the world of trajectories ever be linked together.” 
Engels may have not brought his work in progress to completion, but what 
he left behind continues to help enrich our philosophical understanding 
of nature and improve our orientation to the natural sciences of our time.1
In his 1939 preface to the first English edition of Dialectics of Nature, 
biologist J. B. S. Haldane wrote that Engels’s contributions to the phi-
losophy of nature and the natural sciences are widely known from his 
Anti-Dühring. However, Engels’s more comprehensive Dialectics of Nature 
was rather recently, in the 1920s, discovered and published. “Had Engels’ 
method of thinking been more familiar, the transformations of our ideas 
on physics which have occurred during the last thirty years would have 
been smoother. Had his remarks on Darwinism been generally known, I 
for one would have been saved a certain amount of muddled thinking.”2
Commenting on Engels’s 1876 essay from Dialectics of Nature entitled “The 
Part Played by Labor in the Transition from Ape to Man,” paleontologist 
Stephen Jay Gould wrote that Engels provided us with a “brilliant exposé” 
of an advanced theory of human evolution with the role of labor at its 
heart. Gould was particularly impressed by Engels’s view that the human 
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“hand is not only the organ of labor, it is also the product of labor.… As hu-
mans learned to master their material surroundings, Engels argues, other 
skills were added to primitive hunting — agriculture, spinning, pottery, 
navigation, arts and sciences, law and politics.”3 Elsewhere, Gould asserted 
that all human evolution stands and falls with gene-culture coevolution 
and “the best nineteenth-century case for gene-culture coevolution was 
made by Friedrich Engels in his remarkable essay of 1876.”4
Though not a Marxist himself, the evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr 
found that his own philosophical conception of biology has surprisingly 
much in common with the principles of dialectical materialism. His short 
piece “Roots of Dialectical Materialism” opens with a short anecdote of 
Mark Adams, a U.S. historian of biology who went to the Soviet Union to 
conduct interviews with various scientists, including Kirill M. Zavadsky. 
During the interview, Zavadsky asked: “‘Do you know Ernst Mayr?’ / Adams: 
‘Yes, very well.’ / Zavadsky: ‘Is he a Marxist?’ / Adams: ‘He is not, so far as 
I know.’ / Zavadsky: ‘This is very curious because his writings are pure dia-
lectical materialism.’” Initially puzzled by Zavadsky’s comment, Mayr came 
later to the conclusion that he was actually a proponent of dialectical-mate-
rialist principles such as processuality, universal interconnection, and per-
petual change in nature. “It is not known how many, perhaps most, of these 
principles were arrived at independently by natural history and dialectical 
materialism.… Dialectical materialism was for Engels and Marx a general 
philosophy of nature. It was achieved primarily by an elimination of phys-
icalism and Cartesianism.… It is necessary to develop the characteristics 
and principles of the various ‘provincial’ sciences, such as physics and biolo-
gy, in order to construct eventually a comprehensive Philosophy of Nature, 
which does equal justice to all sciences.”5
In a similar vein, the British biochemist and sinologist Joseph Needham 
drew attention to Engels’s conviction that “nature is through and through 
dialectical” and that Engels correctly directed his dialectics against
the static conceptions of the scientists of his time, who were unprepared 
for the mass of contradictions that science was about to have to deal with, 
and who did not appreciate that Nature is full of apparently irreconcilable 
antagonisms and distinctions which are reconciled at higher organization-
al levels. The well-known rules of the passing of quantity into quality, the 
unity of opposites and the negation of negations, have all become com-
monplaces of scientific thought.6
Mario Bunge, an Argentinian philosopher of science, is well-known for 
his hostility toward Engels’s dialectics and dialectical materialism. Both in 
public and private, Bunge made no secret of his stance. In an encounter 
with Soviet Marxist philosopher Bonifaty M. Kedrov, the old issue of dialec-
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tics came up. “The applied mathematician Mircea Malitza…invited us to a 
party in his flat along with Tarski, Kedrov, and others. When I told Kedrov 
that one of my discrepancies with Marxism was that I rejected dialectics,” 
Kedrov ironically replied: “Don’t worry, tovarich Bunge, for Marx mentions 
dialectics only six times in his Kapital.”7 Yet, in some respect, Bunge gave 
credit to Marxist philosophy, as he admitted that “dialectics has taught us 
to mistrust stillness, for it may hide struggle, and equilibrium, for it may 
be unstable. It has also taught us that not all strife is bad: some may result 
in new and better things.”8 “The plausible kernel of dialectics is constitut-
ed by the hypotheses (i) that every thing is in some process of change or 
other, and (ii) that at certain points in any process new qualities emerge.”9 
Elsewhere, he praised Engels’s insistence on incorporating G. W. F. Hegel’s 
method, rather than his system, into dialectical materialism.10
That Engels the autodidact polymath continues to inspire later genera-
tions of philosophers and natural scientists in one way or another is self-ev-
idently accompanied by the fact that the research material Engels made 
use of is largely incomplete and dated. When preparing Marx and Engels’s 
writings for publication back in the early 1920s, Eduard Bernstein ran into 
the problem of whether Engels’s Dialectics of Nature was worth publishing. 
He asked Albert Einstein for his opinion. Einstein said that the manuscripts 
have no merit from the angle of contemporary physics, but that they cer-
tainly provide interesting insights into Engels’s intellectual biography.11 To 
name another example, Richard Lewontin and Richard Levins’s The Dialecti-
cal Biologist came out with this dedication: “To Frederick Engels, who got it 
wrong a lot of time but who got it right where it counted.”12 Finally, analyti-
cal philosopher Hilary Putnam similarly pointed out the following: “I think 
Engels was one of the most scientifically learned men of his century. He got 
a number of things wrong, but he had an immense general scientific knowl-
edge, and Anti-Dühring, his big book on philosophy of science…is, in many 
ways, a sensible book on philosophy of science, among other things.”13
It is an irony indeed that Engels foresaw much of the future conse-
quences of those sections of his work that required further elaboration. 
In this regard, he wrote in the second preface to Anti-Dühring that
there is much that is clumsy in my exposition and much of it could be 
expressed today in a clearer and more definite form.… The advance of theo-
retical natural science may possibly make my work to a great extent or even 
altogether superfluous. For the revolution which is being forced on theoret-
ical natural science by the mere need to set in order the purely empirical 
discoveries, great masses of which have been piled up, is of such a kind that 
it must bring the dialectical character of natural processes more and more 
to the consciousness even of those empiricists who are most opposed to it.14
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Looking back at the massive achievements of this intellectual giant from 
our present standpoint, the primary question that should concern us is: 
What is indispensable, rather than superfluous, in Engels’s work on phi-
losophy and natural sciences? Scholars from diverse backgrounds invari-
ably agree that the emergentist character of Engels’s dialectics stands out.
For instance, Polish historian Zbigniew A. Jordan forcefully argued that 
“the central idea of emergent evolution is to be found in Anti-Dühring and Di-
alectics of Nature.” According to Engels’s emergentist dialectics, “material real-
ity has a multilevel structure; each of these levels is characterized by a set of 
distinctive properties and irreducible laws; and each level has emerged from 
temporally prior levels according to laws which are absolutely unpredictable 
with respect to those operating at the lower levels.” The idea of emergence is 
intimately tied to Engels’s conception of dialectics as the science of intercon-
nections between coexisting and interdependent systems of physical bodies. 
Engels’s famous dictum that motion is the mode of existence of matter sug-
gests that matter has the power to generate novelty and diversity in nature. 
The principle that “matter is capable of creating novelty and of producing 
higher and higher forms of organization has been part and parcel of dialecti-
cal materialism ever since it was first formulated by Engels.”15 As the Scottish 
mathematician and philosopher Hyman Levy aptly formulated, the dialecti-
cal idea of evolution suggests that “complex forms of living animal and vege-
table matter have emerged from simpler forms that link on through almost 
countless ages back to more and more elementary forms.”16
Even Bunge shares the belief that “dialectical materialism has the merit 
of emphasizing qualitative novelty, or emergence,” or what Mayr called “a 
hierarchy of levels of organization, at each of which a different set of dia-
lectical processes may be at work.”17 Since different levels of complexity of 
motion constitute a hierarchy of levels of organization of matter, as Ted 
Benton observes, nature needs to be considered a hierarchically ordered 
and internally differentiated unity. It is this unity that figures as the pre-
condition for the convergence of particular sciences. Unified knowledge of 
nature presumes an interconnected unity of differentiated and uneven his-
torical development of discrete sciences. “The domain of nature with which 
each science deals represents not only a distinct level of complexity of mo-
tion, but also a definite stage in the historical evolution of the universe.”18
Put differently, it is the historicity of nature as well as the ongoing prog-
ress in particular sciences that necessitate a critical revision of our scientif-
ic framework. There is always a theory-internal need to examine rigorously 
the conceptual apparatus in use. This also implies a continuous integra-
tion of newly emerged and discovered novelties into our present body of 
thought. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that Engels’s dialectics is large-
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ly concerned with evolving interconnections and emerging novelties in 
nature. Relatedly, Engels defines dialectics as the systematic inquiry into 
universal interconnections in nature: “It is precisely dialectics that consti-
tutes the most important form of thinking for present-day natural science, 
for it alone offers the analogue for, and thereby the method of explaining, 
the evolutionary processes occurring in nature, inter-connections in gener-
al, and transitions from one field of investigation to another.”19
In grasping emergent qualities and laws on various levels of organiza-
tion of matter, dialectical theory employs its own conceptual structure, 
scientific language, and investigation method, and takes a categorially 
open-ended shape.
In a passage where Engels discusses some criteria for distinguishing 
and classifying various scientific disciplines, he underlines that each sci-
ence occupies itself with a specific form of motion peculiar to the corre-
sponding terrain. The subject matter of analysis might be “a single form 
of motion or a series of forms of motion that belong together and pass 
into one another.”20 The point is that such a classification needs to follow 
the objective arrangement and inherent developmental sequence of the 
forms of motion in question. It goes without saying that the logical-on-
tological reconstruction of the sequence of natural events must take a 
systematic shape, accordingly. “If I term first of all physics the mechanics 
of molecules, chemistry the physics of atoms, and furthermore biology 
the chemistry of proteins, I wish thereby to express the passing of each 
of these sciences into another, hence both the connection, the continuity, 
and the distinction, the discrete separation.”21
When the organic world grows out of the inorganic, it develops specific 
forms of movement and its own special laws. What historically precedes the 
development of the organic world, that is, the inorganic, lives on in a “sublat-
ed” form.22 Yet, the organic world is evidently different from the inorganic. 
Its system possesses many emergent properties never found in the inorganic 
world. Most crucially, behavioral patterns of organic systems are governed 
by their genetic programs that contain historically acquired information.23
In this context, Engels provides a remarkable illustration that not only ar-
gues for the interconnection and interpenetration of distinct spheres such 
as chemistry and biology, but also draws on an emergent property that is 
nowadays called autopoiesis, a generative feature of self-organizing systems:
In the organic world…all chemical investigations lead back in the last re-
sort to a body — protein — which, while being the result of ordinary chem-
ical processes, is distinguished from all others by being a self-acting, permanent 
chemical process. If chemistry succeeds in preparing this protein, in the 
specific form in which it obviously arose, that of a so-called protoplasm, a 
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specificity, or rather absence of specificity, such that it contains potentially 
within itself all other forms of protein…, then the dialectical transition 
will have been proved in reality, hence completely proved.24
Emergentist dialectics defends the view of “continuous rise in level of orga-
nization” and complexity of systemic mechanisms in nature. Succession 
of each and every level depends on the material circumstances for the 
flowering of its emergent properties that are necessarily unique relative 
to the preceding levels of complexity. Provisionally, different levels can 
be distinguished from each other by means of their respective compo-
nents.25 But they are properly differentiated if the interrelation and in-
ternal organization of the parts are taken into account. Quarks combine to 
form hadrons such as protons and neutrons, which in turn form atoms, 
which constitute molecules, which build up cell constituents and colloi-
dal particles, colloidal aggregates give rise to tissues and living cells, and 
cells to organs and organ systems, and so on.
Friction produces heat, light, and electricity, impact produces heat and 
light if not electricity also — hence conversion of motion of masses into 
molecular motion. We enter the realm of molecular motion, physics, and 
investigate further. But here too we find that molecular motion does not 
represent the conclusion of the investigation. Electricity passes into and 
arises from chemical transformation. Heat and light, ditto. Molecular mo-
tion becomes transformed into motion of atoms—chemistry. The investi-
gation of chemical processes is confronted by the organic world as a field 
for research, that is to say, a world in which chemical processes take place, 
although under different conditions.26
The higher level of complexity contains also those components from 
the lower level. However, the point of emergence is not simply what 
components are contained on what level but rather how those parts are 
interrelated to each other on specific levels of complexity. Subsequently, 
when assessing various interacting levels of complexity, the dialectical 
emergentist is at pains to integrate, and not juxtapose, parts of a whole 
in differentiated degrees of organization of matter.27
[The] organism is certainly the higher unity which within itself unites mechanics, 
physics, and chemistry into a whole where the trinity can no longer be separat-
ed. In the organism, mechanical motion is effected directly by physical and 
chemical change, in the form of nutrition, respiration, secretion, etc., just 
as much as pure muscular movement.… After the transition from chemis-
try to life has been made, then in the first place it is necessary to analyse 
the conditions in which life has been produced and continues to exist, i.e., 
first of all geology, meteorology, and the rest. Then the various forms of 
life themselves, which indeed without this are incomprehensible.28
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The constituent parts of an encompassing whole acquire their integral 
status in that their properties come into existence by means of their in-
teraction and interpenetration, which eventually bring about a specific 
mode of organization peculiar to the whole in question.29 Note here that 
parts do not come together in order to make a whole to which they belong. 
Rather, their very interaction structures the way they are interrelated and 
interpenetrated, resulting in what is called a whole.30
While the philosophical rival of emergentism—that is, reductionism, 
which claims that mechanisms of higher-level complexities are directly 
caused by lower-level dynamics—emergentism effectively resists the idea 
that the whole is “nothing but” the components contained within that 
whole. The whole is more than the total sum of its parts.
Lewontin and Levins carefully point out that there is a difference between 
reduction and reductionism. While it is true that the composition and struc-
ture of a lower level can figure as a “symptom of the forces acting at higher 
levels,” this does not mean that the lower-level situation is also the immediate 
cause of the higher-level interaction. “Reduction looks to lower levels of analy-
sis for differentiating symptoms of forces at higher levels, whereas reduction-
ism claims that forces at lower levels are the actual causes of the phenomena 
higher up.”31 This is to say, because the low-level composition may code-
termine the form within which the interaction of high-level organization 
of matter takes place, what co-contributes to the formation of higher-level 
phenomena can be traced back to their low-level predecessors. In any case, 
low-level and high-level phenomena are by no means linked by immediate 
causality. Rather, they are intermediated by Hegelian “nodal points.”
At some point, Engels contrasts higher and more complex forms of mo-
tion with subsidiary forms. He observes that some scientists of his time 
give an exhaustive weight to motion that is accompanied by a “craze to 
reduce everything to mechanical motion.” Such a treatment of motion 
“obliterates the specific character of other forms of motion.” Relatedly, the 
overt focus on mechanical motion misses that “higher forms of motion” 
are “connected with some real mechanical (external or molecular) mo-
tion” and that “the higher forms of motion simultaneously also produce 
other forms.” This ultimately leads to the ignorance of variety and species 
of motion and interconnection in nature. However, “chemical action is 
not possible without change of temperature and electric changes, organ-
ic life without mechanical, molecular, chemical, thermal, electric, etc., 
changes.” One form of motion is manifested within another, as both inter-
penetrate each other. From the angle of the organizing center of a particu-
lar material sphere of motion, a distinction has to be made between main 
and subsidiary forms. “But the presence of these subsidiary forms does not 
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exhaust the essence of the main forms in each case. One day we shall cer-
tainly ‘reduce’ thought experimentally to molecular and chemical motion 
in the brain; but does that exhaust the essence of thought?”32
These lines make clear that Engels conceived of the lower-level ele-
ments as the historical constituents of the newly emerged higher-level 
organization of matter. Engels agreed that the present forms of motion 
can be traced back to their past developmental record (reduction), but 
denied that higher-level emergent properties can be explained solely by 
the lower-level properties from which they emerge (reductionism).
It is also important to keep in mind that it was a reductionist trend in phi-
losophy and theoretical natural sciences in the second half of the nineteenth 
century that initially motivated Engels to offer an alternative account. In the 
beginning of the 1870s, Engels planned to write a concise response to con-
temporary reductionist materialist views such as Ludwig Büchner’s dualistic 
ontology of physical matter and force, or Carl Vogt and Jacob Moleschott’s 
crude reduction of human thinking to brain substance or phosphorus fat. 
But Engels’s early planned attacks turned later on into a more or less system-
atic undertaking (Dialectics of Nature) when Darwin’s theory of evolution was 
quickly politicized both in socialist and reactionary liberal literature. Alerted 
first by the Paris Commune of 1871, then the economic crisis in 1873, and 
finally the parliamentary success of the Social Democratic Party in 1877, reac-
tionary biologists such as Rudolf Virchow, Oscar Schmidt, and Ernst Haeckel 
tried to weaken the socialist reception of Darwinism. Most forcefully, Haeck-
el tried to keep the social Darwinist idea intact by arguing that the rules of 
the animal kingdom fully apply to humankind.
While all the aforementioned figures were on the “hit list” of Dialectics of 
Nature, Engels was also aware of, and prepared himself to respond to, oth-
er debates that joined the reductionist controversies. One such issue was 
a vivid positivist tendency advocated by figures such as the neo-Kantian 
biologist Matthias Schleiden who openly attacked Hegelian philosophy 
and the materialist worldview against which Rudolf Virchow and Haeckel 
were completely defenseless. Another crucial issue that accompanied the 
ongoing disputes concerned the Ignorabimus account that was voiced pri-
marily by the neo-Kantian botanist Carl Nägeli. With recourse to Kant’s 
thing-in-itself, Nägeli asserted that infinity and the universality of natural 
laws remain a mystery, for only the finite domains of nature are accessible 
to the human mind. This much celebrated proposition was expressive of 
the neo-Kantian trend in the growing fragmentation of particular scienc-
es and positivist hostility toward dialectical philosophies of nature. Oth-
er than the biological theories of cell and evolution, the thermodynamic 
laws of energy were also on Engels’s agenda. As the manuscript fragments 
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of the Dialectics of Nature from the early 1880s document, Engels shifted his 
attention to and was occupied mainly by the recent innovations in phys-
ics until Marx’s death in 1883. Having discovered Marx’s economic manu-
scripts, he had to interrupt his natural scientific inquiries once again and 
devote himself to preparing Marx’s writings for publication instead.
Engels may not have left us a fully worked out philosophy of nature, but 
he left us the general outlines of a research program that is inevitably open 
ended and necessarily incomplete. In fact, he made quite clear that incom-
pleteness and open-endedness are built in features of his program. One of 
the greatest merits of Engels’s unfinished work is that it successfully demon-
strates how the dialectical-materialist inheritance of the Hegelian legacy can 
help us navigate the questions we have yet to ask, problems we have yet to 
formulate, and terrains we have yet to explore. As far as I can see, dialectical 
materialism has only partially claimed its place in the most recent discus-
sions on emergence and reductionism in the philosophy of science.33 Due 
to the constraints of this present piece, I am not able to develop a full argu-
ment, but will instead mention one or two ideas that underpin my intuition.
Incorporating several valuable aspects of the Hegelian heritage into Marx-
ist philosophy, Engels cleared the way for establishing a dialectical-materi-
alist ontology of emergence. He maintained the view that singular finite en-
tities that compound the reality to which we belong have no veritable being 
without collective dependence and mutual interaction among each other. 
Resulting from their transformative evolution, finite parts combine to form 
an infinitely self-developing totality. Such finite parts count as components 
of the whole insofar as they codetermine and cocreate the internal relations 
weaving them together. Accordingly, a rigorous dialectical inquiry into the 
fundamental structures of reality needs to develop a self-critical awareness 
of its categorial framework, one that is open to perpetual remaking. Emer-
gence of objective novelties and their subjective integration into the pres-
ent body of thought are therefore not of peripheral but central concern.34 
In the “Plan 1878” from Dialectics of Nature, Engels formulated this view very 
explicitly as the fourth dialectical law: “spiral form of development.”35
The most basic and simple idea underlying this law concerns the struc-
tural forms of how one thing emerges from another. Put roughly, when a 
set of entities brings about another set of things, the prior level contains 
the potential of what it gives rise to. What comes into view is the posteri-
or manifestation of what precedes it.
One section in Hegel’s Doctrine of Essence in his Logic that usually goes un-
noticed—“Movement of Reflection”—provides further insights into the di-
alectical logic of emergence. This chapter contains passages highlighting 
what Hegel calls “positing,” “external,” and “determining reflection.” The 
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same threefold structure amounts to what he alternatively terms the bina-
ry of “reflection-into-itself” and “reflection-into-other.” Though Hegel pur-
sues there a pure logical investigation and employs a somewhat clumsy 
terminology, his guiding thread promises fertile ground for further elab-
oration of Engels’s emergentist dialectics: when one thing brings about 
another thing (reflection-into-other), it is affected by what has emerged 
from it (reflection-into-itself). This is to say that one thing (positing re-
flection) becomes subject to change (determining reflection) by causing 
another thing to change (external reflection). Hence, the former becomes 
the coproduct of its own activity. This aspect of self-reference or self-orga-
nization is, I believe, at the heart of Engels’s emergentist dialectics. And 
the emergent structures and autopoietic systems are proof of it.
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